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A commentary on
A crisis in comparative psychology: where have all the undergraduates gone?
by Abramson, C. I. (2015). Front. Psychol. 6:1500. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01500
Consider our surprise to suddenly find out that, as researchers in the field of comparative cognition,
we are in fact not comparative psychologists. We admit to not having consistently referred
to ourselves specifically as comparative psychologists, so perhaps we have not lost a definitive
component of our identities, but in turn it feels like waking up one day to find one’s pinky fingers
have been surreptitiously removed and to spend the rest of the day continually realizing that they
had in fact previously been there all along.
WHAT’S IN A NAME?
Core to Abramson’s (2015) paper is the assumption that comparative psychology is a unique
discipline to all others. Abramson gives little indication of what does and does not constitute
comparative psychology, except to present his belief that it cannot be wholly subsumed by
integrative biology, evolutionary psychology, or comparative cognition. However, this only seems a
lesser version of the problem faced by experimental psychologists for decades: is there a psychology
that we all study? We would not all necessarily classify ourselves social psychologists, cognitive
neuroscientists, or applied behavior analysts. And we are often loath to introduce ourselves to other
scientists and laypeople as psychologists, for fear of the ensuing stereotypes too diverse and painful
to discuss here. Does that mean none of us are psychologists, that none of us study psychology?
The doom and gloom surrounding the future of comparative psychology seems mostly
constrained to the specific use of the term. Here the supposed death rattle of the discipline is
based on a dearth of results for narrow searches of a single term, “comparative psychology,” as
though a scientific field lives or dies on the number of times its nebulous moniker is uttered. We
researchers interested in questions about animal behavioral traits and cognitive abilities should not
be focusing our energies on what name adorns our banner. Our unique skill sets are all applied
to asking meaningful mechanistic questions, whether behavioral, cognitive, neurobiological, or
(almost certainly) some combination thereof, that advance our shared scientific aims. The words of
the late Weisman (2008, p. 142) are particularly apt here: “Our job as natural scientists is to explain
nature.”
The main thrust of Abramson’s article is the question, “[W]here is the next generation of
comparative psychologists going to come from?”While he suggests a number of excellent solutions
for increasing undergraduate interest in comparative psychology, they seem largely fixes in search
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of a problem. In fact, the present authors have both used
earlier versions of introductory texts that Abramson takes to
task as failing to properly represent the field, and later were
further exposed to our chosen field by mentors using texts
(e.g., Schwartz, 1989) gallingly titled something other than
“Comparative Psychology.”We represent different generations of
comparative researchers tasked with training the next generation.
And perhaps the best solution to the search for comparative
psychology undergraduates is telegraphed absently in the final
paragraph of the essay, wherein Abramson discusses the use
of “affiliated faculty” for assisting in teaching and advising
comparative graduate programs. We no longer live in a scientific
world of monolithic theoretical institutions, but rather one
featuring a web of interconnected, specialist subfields. Papini
(2011, p. 211) beautifully captured this idea in saying: “As a
field, comparative psychology is almost interdisciplinary by
definition. . . [and] demands not only knowledge of psychological
theories and techniques, but an understanding of behavioral
neuroscience, comparative neurology, behavioral ecology,
developmental biology, and evolutionary theory.” This echoes
the suggestion of Shettleworth (2009, p. 216) that “exploiting
and nourishing those connections, and teaching our students to
do the same, is an essential part of the future of the field.” The
answer that thus seems obvious to us is that the next generation of
comparative psychologists will come from the same constituent
fields as the experts that comprise or complement the discipline,
in perhaps only a slightly more skewed manner than they already
always have.
COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY IS DEAD.
LONG LIVE COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY!
We take no issue with the suggestions offered by Abramson,
as they present reasonably straightforward ways of contacting
students and researchers of disparate scientific backgrounds in
the pursuit of expanding the reach of comparative research.
Instead, we disagree with the concept that comparative
psychology withers in obscurity when it is in fact composed of a
number of thriving, interconnected subfields. The call to improve
the offerings and uptake of comparative science should not just
go out to those who deliberately call themselves comparative
psychologists, but rather to those experts who never quite realized
that they do in fact spend their lives pursuing comparative
psychology.
For our part, we have no qualms about considering
“comparative cognition” to simply be a subfield of “comparative
psychology,” and we intuitively often conflate the two; many
studies in animal cognition laboratories already hew close
to interdisciplinary boundaries that do not necessarily
include a heavy focus on cognition per se. The Journal of
Comparative Psychology and Frontiers: Comparative Psychology
are both eminent destinations for findings from comparative
cognition and ethology laboratories. We all study similar
evolutionary questions using similar behavior-based methods
owing our history to the same pioneering scientists, with the
singular exception that comparative cognition often seeks
specifically to provide evidence for (and against!) particular
mentalistic processes (Zentall, 2013). And surely both disciplines
provide highly similar learning opportunities for students.
Creating a false dichotomy only fractions a specialized field
unnecessarily.
If comparative psychology is in crisis, we suggest it may
be a crisis of identity rather than of continued existence. And
rather than navel-gazing about how comparative psychologists
can prevent the “absorption” of the field into others, it would
be more constructive to see the field as an opportunity to
bring together related sciences under an integrative, collaborative
umbrella. Comparative psychology will continue to flourish so
long as there are those who study behavior and cognition across
species, and will continue to be useful so long as comparative
researchers have these research themes to unify them.
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